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Case No. 20050522-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his convictions for possession of methamphetamine with intent 
to distribute, a first degree felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A 
misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004) (pour-
over provision). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the prosecutor's brief reference to suppression issues during 
closing argument warrant a mistrial where curative instructions and 
strong evidence of defendant's guilt rendered the reference harmless? 
'"Because a trial court is in the best position to determine an alleged error's impact 
on the proceedings, [this Court] will not reverse a trial court's denial of a mistrial motion 
based on prosecutorial misconduct absent an abuse of discretion.'" State v. Pritchett, 
2003 UT 24, K 10, 69 P.3d 1278 (quoting State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 276 (Utah 
1998)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
No constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are relevant to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was originally charged by information with possession of 
methamphetamine with intent to distribute, a first degree felony; possession of 
methamphetamine, a first degree felony; possession of marijuana, a third degree felony; 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor; driving without insurance, a 
class B misdemeanor; and driving on a suspended license, a class B misdemeanor (R2-4). 
After a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over on all of the possession charges 
(R25). 
Before trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence found in his vehicle and 
evidence found in a subsequent search of his home (R67-72,92-94). The State opposed 
defendant's motion (R78-87). Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied 
defendant's motion as to evidence found in his vehicle but granted his motion as to 
evidence found in his residence (Rl 00-01,105-07). 
Based on the trial court's ruling, the State filed an amended information charging 
defendant with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, a first degree 
felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor (R122-23). A jury 
trial followed. Defendant moved for a mistrial after closing argument, alleging 
prosecutorial misconduct in the State's closing argument (R204:183). After the trial court 
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denied defendant's motion, the jury convicted defendant as charged (R124-28,171-
72,192-95; R204:189). Defendant was sentenced to five-years-to-life in prison on his 
first degree felony conviction; his sentence on his misdemeanor conviction was stayed 
(R192-95). 
Defendant timely appealed (Rl87-88). The supreme court transferred the matter to 
this Court for disposition. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The evidence. On June 25, 2004, a police officer stopped the truck defendant was 
driving because it lacked a license plate (R204:59-60). When approached by the officer, 
defendant acknowledged that the unregistered truck was his and that he did not have a 
driver's license (R204:61). A subsequent record check confirmed that defendant's 
driver's license had been suspended (R240:61). The check provided no information on 
the registration of the vehicle (R240:61). 
Based on the registration and license violations, defendant was arrested and his 
vehicle searched in preparation for its impound (R204:62,68). The search revealed an 
uncovered speaker hole in the driver's door (R204:68). Inside the hole, in a cloth bag, 
were 51 grams of fresh methamphetamine, a scale, and several small plastic baggies 
(R204:68,70-71). Although the truck was "filthy dirty," the cloth bag showed no signs of 
accumulated dirt or dust (R204:72,74,125,146). 
Sergeant Keith Millett, who leads the Iron/Garfield County Narcotics Task Force, 
testified that 51 grams of methamphetamine has a street value of over $5,000 
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(R204:90,93). "[I]t's very valuable to a person that's dealing—dealing the substance. 
It's like cash. They're gonna actually keep it close b[y].. . . They're not gonna arbitrarily 
leave it out for someone else to pick up or lose or be taken" (R204:96). 
In his defense, defendant called one witness, a self-employed auto mechanic and 
close family friend named Nelson S. Gallaagr (R204:131,133,145). Gallaagr testified 
that, about two weeks before defendant's arrest, defendant asked him to work on 
defendant's truck, a Chevy pickup that was not running (R204:133). At the time, the 
truck sat unlocked in a parking lot owned by a small local company named Agrinautics 
(R204:134). Gallaagr thought about 12 people worked at the company (R204:134). 
However, the parking lot was next to Airport Road, which got a lot of traffic (R204:136). 
Gallaagr could tell that the truck had been sitting in the lot "for a year or two" 
because the engine "was all fuzzy just from the dirt, just from the desert and all that stuff 
and because "rats had a nest in the air breather" (R204:135). Gallaagr and defendant used 
a forklift to pull out the engine. They took the engine to Gallaagr's shop, where he 
worked on it for about a week and a half (R204:135,137,144). 
After Gallaagr rebuilt the engine, he and defendant put it back into the truck 
(R204:138). Defendant drove the truck away that day (R204:138). Defendant returned 
the next day because the truck "did not have power breaks" and because "the carburetor 
wasn't workin' right because it set so long" (R204:138). Defendant left again after those 
repairs were done (R204:138). He was arrested about an hour later (R204:138). 
4 
Gallaagr did not know how the truck ended up in the Agrinautics parking lot or 
how defendant had come to own it (R204:140,146). He had been in the truck while 
working on it (R204:141). He never saw any drugs in the door (R204:142). "All [he] 
saw was a filthy dirty truck" (R204:146). Gallaagr stated, however, that he "never had a 
reason to even look in the door" (R204:142). He explained that his "main part was under 
the hood" (R204:142). Gallaagr did not put the drugs in the car door, nor were the drugs 
his(R204:143). 
Neither the bag nor its contents were analyzed for fingerprints (R204:86-87). 
Opening statements. In his opening statement, the prosecutor summarized the 
evidence he planned to present. The prosecutor stated that the evidence would show that 
defendant was arrested after having been stopped by police for driving in an unregistered 
truck. A subsequent search of the truck revealed a large quantity of methamphetamine in 
a hole in the driver's side door, together with a small scale and small baggies. Defendant 
was the driver and sole occupant of the truck at the time (R204:52-54). 
In his opening statement, defense counsel acknowledged that drugs had been 
found in the vehicle he had been driving. Counsel asserted, however, that "[t]he problem 
is that.. . the State has the burden of establishing a nexus between, ah, Mr. Sherry and 
the drugs" (R204:55). Counsel asserted that the State would not be able to meet that 
burden where "the truck wasn't registered," "[i]t hadn't ran for years," and "it's been 
parked out in—in a business for years" (R205:55). Moreover, "there's no—no indication 
of fingerprints or any other sort of type of evidence that would indicate that [defendant] 
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. . . had knowledge about these in these drugs" (R204:57). Rather, "the evidence is going 
to indicate that Mr. Sherry had no idea the[ drugs] were in there" (R204:56). 
Closing argument.1 In closing argument, the prosecutor reviewed the elements 
instructions for the two crimes as they related to the evidence (R204:154-58). He then 
addressed the reasonable doubt instruction and whether reasonable doubt had been raised 
in this case (R204:158-62). The prosecutor noted that, although he presented no 
fingerprint evidence, "[w]e have had a little talk about fingerprints and why the law 
enforcement didn't get fingerprints" (R204:160). The prosecutor also noted evidence 
"that the truck was dirty—very dirty inside" and "[y]et this bag, which . . . is in 
substantially the same condition it was in at the time it was taken from the truck . . . looks 
pretty clean" (R204:161). Thus, "this evidence hadn't sat in that truck, you know, for a 
long extended period of time" (R204:161). 
In his closing, defense counsel focused on his contention that the evidence raised a 
reasonable doubt concerning whether defendant had possessed the drugs and 
paraphernalia found in his truck. Counsel noted that the truck wasn't registered at the 
time police stopped it; it hadn't been insured since 1999; it hadn't been running for a long 
time; it had sat for at least some period of time in a company parking lot; it had not been 
locked because there was no key to unlock it; it was then worked on by a mechanic for 
some two weeks; shortly after defendant drove it away, he returned it for more repairs; 
and defendant was arrested shortly after retrieving the truck once those repairs were 
]The transcript of closing arguments is attached at Addendum A. 
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completed (R204:169-70). Counsel then focused on the lack of fingerprint evidence 
(R204:172). He concluded that, "when you have a situation like we have here," where 
"the State has not established in any manner exclusive control" by defendant and where 
"we don't have any fingerprints to prove or establish that he touched this or ever had 
control of it, I don't think the State has met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt" (R204:174-75). 
In his rebuttal, the prosecutor addressed the various arguments defendant had 
presented (R204:175-80). The prosecutor then referred to the suppression hearing that 
had taken place before trial (R204:180): "Sometimes juries get—they get caught up in, 
ah, suppression issues and things like that when they get back to deliberate. I just want to 
tell you that—that those issues, ah, have already been resolved in this case. In other 
words—"(R204:180-81). 
Defendant objected to the prosecutor's comment as "inappropriate" (R204:181). 
The trial court agreed, stating that "[t]here's no evidence in the record regarding that the 
jury can consider" (R204:181). The prosecutor explained his comment: 
Okay. My point is that when you get back to deliberate, ah, 
you're not to consider search and seizure issues or whether or not the 
search was lawful that was performed by Detective Gower. That 
your law, as it's contained in those instructions, 1 through 24, that's 
where you're to find your law and your instructions. And anything 
outside of that, ah, is not to be considered by—by the jury, together 
in your deliberations. That is where your law is contained. 
(R204:181). Defendant did not object to the prosecutor's explanation (R204:181). 
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After once more directing the jury "to your jury instructions" to answer any 
"questions about anything, you know, regarding this case, as far as the law goes," the 
prosecutor concluded by asking the jury to convict defendant on both charges (R204:181-
82). 
Jury instructions,2 After closing argument, the jury received its final instructions. 
Instruction 2 directed the jury that "[y]ou are to be governed in this case by the evidence 
presented to you and the law as I state it to you," and that "[y]ou may not consider . . . 
guesswork . . . in deciding the guilt or innocence of the defendant" (Rl 69; Jury Inst. 2). 
Instruction 3 instructed the jury that they "may not consider evidence which is 
excluded" or "consider as evidence statements of the attorneys" (R168; Jury. Inst. 3). The 
same instruction then reiterated that counsels' statements were not to be considered 
evidence: 
Statements, arguments and remarks of the attorneys are 
intended to help you understand the evidence and apply the law, but 
such statements are not evidence. You should disregard any 
statement of any attorney which has no basis in the evidence coming 
from witnesses, documents or stipulations received in evidence in 
this case. 
(R168; Jury Inst. 3). 
Defendant's mistrial motion.3 After the jury was excused to deliberate, 
defendant moved for a mistrial (R204:183). Defendant argued that the prosecutor's 
2Copies of instructions 2 and 3 are attached at Addendum B. 
3The transcript of argument on defendant's mistrial motion is attached at 
Addendum C. 
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reference to suppression issues in rebuttal was "prosecutorial misconduct" because "[i]t 
has nothing to do with any defense that we presented and does nothing more than try and 
tell the jury that there's evidence out there that he wasn't able to present" (R204:183). 
The trial court denied defendant's motion: 
I didn't hear anything in the comment that would have 
inferred to the jury that there was other evidence that they weren't 
told about. Ah, so I don't view that as the purpose of the statement. 
On the other hand[,] I don't think that's appropriate for the 
prosecutor [to] tell the jury about prior proceedings that aren't in 
the—aren't in the evidence. And, so I find that I think that it was 
inappropriate to make that comment that those issues had already 
been dealt with. On the other hand, I don't think it rises to the level 
that requires a mistrial, so I'm gonna deny the motion for a mistrial. 
(R204:189). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his mistrial 
motion. Defendant claims that a mistrial was warranted because the prosecutor's 
reference to "suppression issues" during closing argument implied that other evidence 
existed to support defendant's guilt. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
To establish prosecutorial misconduct, defendant must show both that the 
prosecutor improperly referred the jury to matters not proper for its consideration and that 
the comments significantly influenced the jury's verdict. 
Here, even assuming that the prosecutor's comment was improper, defendant 
cannot show that he was prejudiced by it. First, in context, the prosecutor's comment did 
not imply that other evidence of defendant's guilt existed. Second, the jury received 
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numerous curative instructions following the prosecutor's comment. Third, the evidence 
against defendant was strong. 
ARGUMENT 
THE PROSECUTOR'S BRIEF REFERENCE TO SUPPRESSION 
ISSUES DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT DID NOT WARRANT A 
MISTRIAL WHERE CURATIVE INSTRUCTIONS AND STRONG 
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S GUILT RENDERED THE 
REFERENCE HARMLESS 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion 
for a mistrial. Defendant claims that "[t]he prosecutor's inappropriate statements 
[addressing suppression issues] tainted the trial with the information that there existed 
other incriminating evidence which had been suppressed and thus which the jury was not 
allowed to hear, thus depriving the Defendant of his right to a fair trial" Aplt. Br. at 5. 
Defendant's claim fails where he was not prejudiced by the prosecutor's comments, even 
if those comments were improper. 
'"Because a trial court is in the best position to determine an alleged error's impact 
on the proceedings, [this Court] will not reverse a trial court's denial of a mistrial motion 
based on prosecutorial misconduct absent an abuse of discretion.'" State v. Pritchett, 
2003 UT 24, Tj 10, 69 P.3d 1278 (quoting State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 276 (Utah 
1998). "'This standard is met only if the error is substantial and prejudicial such that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence, there would have been a more 
favorable result for the defendant.'" Id. (quoting Harmon, 956 P.2d at 276) (additional 
citations and quotation marks omitted). 
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I. General law governing prosecutorial misconduct claims. 
To establish prosecutorial misconduct, defendant must show that "'the 
prosecutor's comments call[ed] the jurors' attention to matters not proper for their 
consideration and [that] the comments have a reasonable likelihood of prejudicing the 
jury by significantly influencing its verdict.'" State v. Jimenez, 2001 UT App 68, f 15, 21 
P.3d 1142 (quoting State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68, % 18, 8 P.3d 1025) (additional citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted), cert, denied, 29 P.3d 1 (Utah 2001). '"In determining 
whether a given statement constitutes prosecutorial misconduct, the statement must be 
viewed in light of the totality of the evidence presented at trial.'" State v. Longshaw, 961 
P.2d 925, 927 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 
App. 1992)). 
Against that backdrop, the law is well-established that a prosecutor may not refer 
to previously excluded evidence during closing argument. See, e.g., People v. Crew, 74 
P.3d 820, 839 (Cal. 2003) (holding that it is improper "for a prosecutor to make remarks 
in . . . closing arguments that refer to evidence determined to be inadmissible in a 
previous ruling of the trial court"), cert, denied, 541 U.S. 991 (2004); People v. Mullen, 
566 N.E.2d 222, 227 (111. 1990) (holding that "it is improper to refer to evidence which 
has been excluded" during closing argument); Pure v. State, 681 N.W.2d 9, 19 (Minn. 
2004) (holding that prosecutor's reference in closing argument to evidence ruled 
inadmissible was improper); State v. Williams, 119 S.W.3d 674, 680 (Mo. App. 2003) 
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(holding that prosecutor commits error by commenting on or referring to excluded 
evidence). 
The law is also well-established that a prosecutor may not use a defendant's 
invocation of his constitutional rights against him during closing argument. See, e.g., 
State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 266 (Utah 1998) (citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 
(1976), for proposition that "use of post-Miranda silence for impeachment purposes 
violates Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment"). 
However, a prosecutor's brief reference to a defendant's invocation of his 
constitutional rights does not constitute prosecutorial misconduct unless the State, "in 
some way, use[s] the defendant's [invocation] to undermine the exercise of those rights." 
Harmon, 956 P.2d at 268. In other words, a new trial is warranted only "[i]f the error is 
substantial and prejudicial to the extent that there is a reasonable probability that it 
affected the reliability of the trial outcome." Id. This rule also attains when the 
prosecutor only briefly references suppression matters. See, e.g., People v. Chavez, 762 
N.E.2d 553, 564 (111. App. Ct. 2001) (holding that prosecutor's improper comment on 
suppressed evidence in closing argument was harmless where evidence of guilt was 
overwhelming), appeal den., 770 N.E.2d 221 (111. 2002); People v. Stein, 366 N.E.2d 629, 
636 (111. App. Ct. 1977) (holding that two references to suppression motion during 
questioning of witness were not prejudicial where prosecutor did not "specifically state[] 
to what the motion to suppress referred [or] specifically [tell] the jury that the court had 
denied defendant's motion to suppress"); People v. Smith, 350 N.E.2d 791, 793 (111. App. 
12 
Ct. 1976) (finding no prejudice where, after prosecutor mentioned suppression hearing 
during cross-examination of defendant, trial court sustained defendant's objection); State 
v. McNeil, 658 N.W.2d 228, 232-33 (Minn. App. 2003) (holding that prosecutor's 
misconduct in eliciting suppressed evidence on multiple occasions was harmless where 
evidence of guilt was overwhelming); People v. Rivera, 530 N.Y.S.2d 269, 269 (App. 
Div. 1988) (holding that prosecutor's improper comment on suppressed evidence was 
harmless where "any possible prejudice . . . was cured by the court's prompt curative 
instruction and jury charge, which informed the jury that statements of the attorneys did 
not constitute evidence"); United States v. Grubbs, 776 F.2d 1281, 1288-89 & n.4 (5th Cir. 
1985) (holding that prosecutor's improper comment on suppression hearing and 
suppressed evidence was "unlikely" to lead jury "astray" and thus "did not have the 
requisite detrimental effect on the jury's ability to judge the evidence fairly" to rise to 
level of plain error) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).4 
Finally, this Court need not decide whether a prosecutor's comments were 
improper if defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by them. See State v. Adams, 
4Citing State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916 (Utah App. 1995), defendant asks this 
Court to require a showing that the prosecutor's comment was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt before this Court upholds the trial court's mistrial ruling. See Aplt. Br. 
at 4. Genovesi, however, involved "the admission of evidence seized in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment" to prove the defendant's guilt. Genovesi, 909 P.2d at 922. This case 
does not involve the admission of excluded evidence. Thus, the constitutional 
harmlessness analysis does not apply. See Harmon, 956 P.2d at 269 (applying general 
harmlessness analysis to prosecutor's inadvertent reference to defendant's invocation of 
right to silence). 
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955 P.2d 7815 786 (Utah App. 1998) ("We do not address whether the prosecutor's 
comments constituted error because we find no evidence of prejudice."), affd, 2002 UT 
42, 5 P.3d 642. 
II. Analysis 
Here, the trial court deemed the prosecutor's statement improper. Assuming, but 
not conceding the correctness of that ruling, defendant has not shown that he was 
prejudiced by it. See Adams, 955 P.2d at 786. 
First, the prosecutor's comment did not "specifically state[] to what the motion to 
suppress referred [or] specifically [tell] the jury that the court had denied defendant's 
motion to suppress." Stein, 366 N.E.2d at 636 (holding that two references to suppression 
motion during questioning of witness were not prejudicial where prosecutor's reference to 
suppression motion was inadvertent). Indeed, it was so vague as to not tell the jury much 
of anything. 
Moreover, in explaining his comment, the prosecutor directed the jury's attention 
away from any inference that additional evidence existed when he specifically asked the 
jury not to consider the legality of the search of defendant's car (R204:181 (directing the 
jury not to consider "whether or not the search was lawful that was performed by 
Detective Gower")). By explaining that his comment concerned the jury's possible 
consideration of the legality of that search, the prosecutor dispelled any inference that his 
comment referred to any other search or evidence. 
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Thus, the trial court correctly found that nothing "in the comment... would have 
[implied] to the jury that there was other evidence that they weren't told about" 
(R204:183). See Harmon, 956 P.2d at 268 (holding that brief reference to a defendant's 
invocation of right to silence does not constitute prosecutorial misconduct unless the 
State, "in some way, use[s] the defendant's [invocation] to undermine the exercise of 
those rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment"). 
Second, although the trial court did not give an immediate curative instruction 
after sustaining defendant's objection, the prosecutor essentially did when, without 
objection, he explained to the jury that his point was only "that when you get back to 
deliberate,... you're not to consider search and seizure issues," that the governing law 
was "your instructions," and that "anything outside of that, ah, is not to be considered" 
(R204:181-82). 
The jury received additional curative instructions in its general jury instructions. 
Instruction 2 directed the jury that "[y]ou are to be governed in this case by the evidence 
presented to you and the law as I state it to you," and that "[y]ou may not consider . . . 
guesswork . . . in deciding the guilt or innocence of the defendant" (R169; Jury Inst. 2). 
Instruction 3 instructed the jury both that they "may not consider evidence which is 
excluded" and that "you may not consider as evidence statements of the attorneys" (R168; 
Jury. Inst. 3). The same instruction then reiterated that counsels' statements were not to 
be considered evidence: 
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Statements, arguments and remarks of the attorneys are 
intended to help you understand the evidence and apply the law, but 
such statements are not evidence. You should disregard any 
statement of any attorney which has no basis in the evidence coming 
from witnesses, documents or stipulations received in evidence in 
this case. 
(R168; Jury Inst. 3). See State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, % 24, 999 P.2d 7 (rejecting 
prosecutorial misconduct claim where trial court gave immediate curative instruction and 
then additional curative instruction in overall jury instructions, concluding that 
"[djefendant has not shown, as is his burden, that the comment was so prejudicial as to 
defeat the mitigating effect of the court's two curative instructions"); see also Longshaw, 
961 P.2d at 929-30 (holding that instruction directing jury to be governed by jury 
instructions was sufficient to cure prosecutor's misstatement of law in closing argument; 
citing cases). Cf. Harmon, 956 P.2d at 271 (noting that "curative instructions are a settled 
and necessary feature of our judicial process and one of the most important tools by 
which a court may remedy errors at trial"). 
Finally, the evidence against defendant was strong. Fifty-one grams of 
methamphetamine was found in a dirt-free bag in a hole in the driver's door of a very 
dirty truck in which defendant, the driver and owner, was the sole occupant 
(R204:61,68,70-72,74,93,125). The meth had a street value of over $5,000 (R204:93). It 
was therefore "very valuable to a person that's . . . dealing the substance" and something 
its owner was "gonna actually keep . . . close b[y]" (R204:96). Where "the evidence of 
[defendant's] guilt was strong," this Court "will not presume the prosecutor's [comments] 
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were prejudicial, especially in light of the [subsequent] curative admonition to the jury." 
Longshaw, 961 P.2d at 931; see also State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 805 (Utah App. 1998) 
(rejecting prosecutorial misconduct claim where, "even if there was error," "the evidence 
against defendant. . . was considerable"; citing cases). 
In sum, given the limited nature of the prosecutor's reference, the curative 
instructions that followed, and the strength of the evidence establishing defendant's guilt, 
defendant was not prejudiced by the prosecutor's comment, even if that comment was 
improper. The trial court, therefore, did not err in denying defendant's mistrial motion. 
Defendant's cases do not alter that result. Both State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916, 
920-21 (Utah App. 1995), and Walton v. State, 431 S.W.2d 462, 467 (Ark. 1968), see 
Aplt. Br. at 4, 7, involve the trial court's erroneous denial of a defendant's motion to 
suppress evidence that was then admitted at trial. In both cases, therefore, the 
determinative issue was whether the defendant was prejudiced by the jury's knowledge of 
specific evidence that should have been suppressed. See Genovesi, 909 P.2d at 921-22; 
Walton, 431 S.W.2d at 467. By contrast, in this case, the prosecutor never identified the 
evidence that was the subject of defendant's suppression motion, let alone presented that 
evidence to the jury (R204:180-81). Thus, Genovesi and Walton are inapposite. 
Along the same line, Robinson v. State, 623 S.W.2d 534, 535-36 (Ark. App. 1981), 
involved the prosecutor's reference to specific evidence that had been suppressed before 
trial. See Aplt. Br. at 4, 7. State v. Movant, 574 A.2d 502, 510 (NJ. Super. App. Div. 
1990), involved the use of suppressed evidence by one co-defendant against another. See 
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Aplt. Br. at 6. As in Genovesi and Walton, the issue in those cases was whether the 
defendant was prejudiced by the reference to or use of specific evidence that should have 
been excluded. See Robinson, 623 S.W.2d at 536; Movant, 51A A.2d at 510. Because the 
prosecutor here never identified the evidence suppressed by defendant's motion, 
Robinson and Movant, like Genovesi and Walton, are distinguishable. 
Nelson v. State, 513 S.W.2d 496 (Ark. 1974), does not address inadmissible 
evidence improperly referenced at trial. See Aplt. Br. at 4, 7. Thus, Nelson does not 
involve any of the issues raised by defendant's brief. Nelson, 513 S.W.2d at 498-501.5 
The most applicable case cited by defendant is State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262 
(Utah 1998). [n that case, Harmon challenged the trial court's denial of his motion for 
mistrial after the prosecutor inadvertently elicited suppressed evidence that defendant had 
invoked his right to silence. Id. at 266-67. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's 
ruling where the State's eliciting the evidence was inadvertent and the State had not "in 
some way, use[d] the defendant's silence to undermine the exercise of those rights 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 268. Given that "the fact of Harmon's 
post-arrest silence was not submitted to the jury as evidence from which it was allowed to 
draw any permissible inference," the court held, "the elicited statement was not 
prejudicial." Id. at 269. 
5Although Nelson is cited in Robinson, it appears to be cited only for the 
unremarkable proposition that prejudicial errors require reversal. See Robinson, 623 
S.W.2d at 536, Nelson, 513 S.W.2d at 499. 
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Here, as in Harmon, the prosecutor's reference to the pre-trial suppression hearing 
was harmless. As previously discussed, the prosecutor never attempted to, "in some way, 
use the defendant's [filing of a suppression motion] to undermine the exercise of those 
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." Harmon, 956 P.2d at 268. Indeed, the 
comment was so cryptic as to not convey much of anything to the jury. Moreover, the 
prosecutor's comment was followed by a curative explanation and curative instructions, 
and the evidence against defendant was strong. Under such circumstances, the 
prosecutor's comment did not "'so likely influence[] the jury that the defendant cannot be 
said to have had a fair trial.'" Id. at 274-75 (quoting State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 
1231 (Utah 1997)). 
Consequently, even if the prosecutor's comment were error, the trial court did not 
err in denying defendant's mistrial motion. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's 
convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED So_ January 2006. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KAREN A. KLUCZNpC 
Assistant Attorney General 
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OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT 
(Court read Instructions No. 8 through and 
Including NO. 24, and verdict forms.) 
THE COURT: In my hand I hold the Verdict Form of 
which I just spoke. There's the caption of this case 
(Indicated). It has the two counts listed and the two choices 
of verdict as to each count, guilty or not guilty. 
On the second page there is a date for -- and a 
signature line for the Foreperson of the jury to execute so 
that any verdict set out on this form is certified to be the 
unanimous verdict of the jury. Below that there are lines for 
concurring jurors. All those who agree with the verdict 
recorded on the form should sign as a concurring juror. That 
means that the Foreperson, assuming he or she agrees with the 
verdict, would also sign and there would be eight signatures 
there as concurring jurors. 
The verdict is simply indicated by placing an X or a 
check above the appropriate "yes". One of those marks as to 
each count. 
Okay. Ready for closing arguments. 
Mr. Garrett. 
PLAINTIFF'S INITIAL CLOSING ARGUMENT 
BY MR. GARRETT: May it please the Court, counsel, 
members of the jury. Just want to start off, ah, by thanking 
you again for your time and your service. I also want to 
clarify one thing. Ah, in a criminal trial like this, 
although the attorneys do a lot of talking, we don't actually, 
OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT 
PAGE 152 
ah, present, ah, or give evidence that goes on the record. 
The evidence was presented by the witnesses, by Commander 
Millett and by Agent Gower and Officer Ball. That's the 
evidence that — that you're going to consider. 
The things that I say is not evidence. I, myself, 
and Mr. Slavens, we're here to help the proceedings go along 
to present witnesses, ah, to ask questions, ah, to -- to help 
introduce the evidence into evidence, but we don't actually — 
the things that we say is not evidence. Okay. The evidence 
came from the witnesses and this that is marked (Indicated) 
which you'll have a chance to take back in the Jury Room with 
you. That's the evidence that you're gonna consider today. 
Now this is the chance for me to get up and tell 
what you about what I think about the law that you've been 
given, the Jury Instructions. And it's also a chance for me 
to comment on the evidence and the way that I see it. Mr. 
Slavens will have the same opportunity. 
When I first started out, I told you that this case 
wasn't factually a difficult case, and it's not. Ah, it's a 
stop of a vehicle, a search of the vehicle, and then find 
drugs. That's the case. Factually, pretty -- pretty slick. 
I mean there wasn't a lot of witnesses today that testified. 
I had three and the defense had one. And there's seven items 
of evidence that you'll consider. So -- so factually, not — 
not really a difficult case. I think what it's gonna come 
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down to for you jurors, when you get back in deliberation, ah, 
is you're gonna apply the -- the facts that you have to the 
law as it!s been given to you, and you1re gonna reach a 
reasonable conclusion. 
ThatTs what — that's what I want to talk to you 
about is the law. I have, ah, selected two instructions I'd 
like you to pay close attention to. You need to pay close 
attention to all of them. But there's two that are the 
elements of the crimes. 
Instruction No. 10 is the elements for Unlawful 
Possession Of Methamphetamine With Intent To Distribute. And 
Instruction No. 11 is Unlawful Possession Of Drug 
Paraphernalia. And in order to you to convict this defendant 
here today, you have to find that the State -- that I have 
presented enough evidence through my witnesses to meet each 
and every element of the crime. 
And so let's just look at jury Instruction No. 10. 
Ah, it's the -- it's the instruction for Possession With 
Intent To Distribute. It states that the State must prove and 
you must find unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt each 
and every one of the following elements. 
No. 1. That the defendant acted knowingly and 
intentionally. Okay. 
You have, also as part of your jury instructions --
I believe it's No. 12 — is your definitions. You need to 
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know your definitions. To — to, ah, read the definition on 
what knowingly is and what intentionally is. 
Someone who acts knowingly and intentionally, it!s 
their purpose to do what they did. In other words, it would 
be his purpose to possess the drugs. Okay? That would be 
acting knowingly and intentionally. 
Element No. 2. That the defendant did possess the 
controlled substance methamphetamine. Here you have — you 
have, ah, the STATE'S EXHIBIT NO. 2, which is methamphetamine 
(Indicated). It was tested by the Crime Lab. 51 grams of 
methamphetamine. And you'll have back there with you, too, 
Mr. Gerlits's report, which — he's the one that tested the 
drugs. That's his signature here. And he states that in this 
package there is 51 grams of methamphetamine. Methamphetamine 
is a controlled substance and your jury instructions instruct 
you on that. 
So you're gonna look at No. 2. Did the defendant 
possess the controlled substance, methamphetamine? And if you 
found that we have met our burden in proving that he 
possessed, knowingly and intentionally, methamphetamine, you 
can just check those off and move on down to No. 3, that the 
defendant possessed the methamphetamine with the intent to 
distribute the same. That's the -- that's the next element 
you've got to prove. Did he intend to possess this with the 
intent for distribute (Indicated)? And the evidence that you 
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have on that element, if you111 recall, Officer Millett 
testified that — that these (Indicated) — first of all, the 
quantity is substantial enough that itfs a distributable 
amount. Anybody who has 51 grams, over $5,000 worth of 
methamphetamine, that's more than what they would normally use 
for personal consumption. So he indicated, from his 
experience, that that's a distributable amount. Along with 
that he also indicated these baggies in here are used to 
package the controlled substance methamphetamine (Indicated). 
In his training and experience, it's very probable 
for him to see a larger quantity separated into smaller 
quantities, packaged, and then distributed that way. 
So you have these little baggies in here (Indicated) 
and then you have these -- the scales (Indicated). And the 
scales, as was testified by both Commander Millett and Officer 
Gower, are used to weigh out the methamphetamine, and then --
and then place it into the baggies. 
From that evidence you could — you could reasonably 
conclude that the defendant possessed the methamphetamine with 
the intent to distribute. 
Ah, kind of interesting when Officer Millett stated 
that this was like cash to people that use drugs (Indicated). 
Ah, this is cash. $5,000 right there. And it's interesting, 
because you wouldn't — looking at this, you wouldn't think 
that would be $5,000 worth. It kind of looks like little 
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white crystals. Rock-type crystals. And you know, you 
wouldn't think that would be worth $5,000. But according to 
him, who -- he's been in this investigation of narcotics for a 
long time. Ah, he -- he knows what that substance sells for. 
$5,000. 
So if you find that we've met that element, you can 
check it off and go on to No. 4. The fourth — the fourth 
element here is that these acts occurred on or about June 
25 , 2004, Iron County. You've heard evidence that Officer 
Ball pulled the defendant's vehicle over near the Crystal Inn 
on June 25 , 2004, in Cedar City, which is in Iron County, 
State of Utah. That's not disputed. 
And so that's — that's the first charge. Okay. 
And if you can check off those — those four elements there, 
then -- then — then you're saying the State has met its 
burden, and you can convict the defendant of Unlawful 
Possession Of Methamphetamine With Intent To Distribute. 
The second charge is No. 11. You go through the 
same process. Okay? 
Did the defendant act knowingly and intentionally, 
No. 1? No. 2. Did the defendant possess drug paraphernalia? 
And, ah, No. 3 kind of gives a — a description of 
paraphernalia. The said drug paraphernalia was used to 
compound, convert, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, 
store, contain, conceal, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce 
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a controlled substance into the human body. I certainly think 
you can infer, from the evidence that you'll be looking at 
that -- and I think the paraphernalia — the scale certainly 
is paraphernalia used to weigh out the product. And then the 
little baggies used to package the methamphetamine. 
And then No. 4. That these acts occurred on — on 
or about June 25 , 2004. And again you can look through 
that. But if you can check those all off, ah, then you — you 
can find the State, ah, met its burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. And you should convict the defendant on 
both counts. 
If — if you can't find that we've proved each one 
of those -- each and every one of those elements, then — then 
you would have to dismiss the — that particular count, if you 
find the State didn't meet its burden. 
It is the State's burden to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and I want to talk to you a little bit about 
reasonable doubt. Instruction No. 8 refers to that. And 
right there on the last paragraph it says proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute 
certainty. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of 
proof which satisfies the mind convinces the understanding of 
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it and 
obviates all reasonable doubt. So it's that degree of proof 
which satisfies the mind and convinces the understanding. 
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A reasonable group of people here. There's eight of 
you. Eight jurors who will go back and — and use your 
experience, your knowledge — your experience, your 
understanding. And together you're gonna talk about — about 
these facts and you're gonna — you're gonna reach a unanimous 
conclusion. 
And I would just ask you to look at the facts and 
ask, "Does it make sense? Does it — does it sound right what 
the State is alleging here?" 
Ah, I think, you know, based on the facts that have 
been presented to you, ah, the defendant owned the truck in 
question. That's the evidence that you have in front of you. 
There's nothing to contradict that. This was the defendant's 
truck. 
Ah, these drugs were found inside this bag 
(Indicated). I think it's reasonable to believe that the 
defendant would try and conceal an illegal item from the 
public view. I don't find it hard to believe at all that the 
drugs were hidden back in this compartment (Indicated). If 
you have something that is of this much value and is this 
illegal, you're gonna try and conceal it from law enforcement 
or from other people that may turn you in. 
Of course, they're gonna consume it. They'll put it 
somewhere where it's not easy for other people to see. 
Captain Millett testified again about how this is 
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like cash to those, ah — those that deal in drugs 
(Indicated). 
Who, in their right mind — and would any of you 
leave $5,000 somewhere unattended or not know where it — 
where it was? 
Would you just leave $5,000 somewhere? You know, 
probably not. That's a lot of money to you. It's a lot of 
mine to me. It's a lot of money to anybody. 
I would know where my — where my money was, if it 
was $5,000, and I wouldn't leave it in a place, ah, where I 
didn't know I could leave it there or unattended. 
Ah, he testified that — that people that are 
involved in the drug trade, they like to keep the drug close 
to 'em; know where it is. Around their person. Well, how 
much closer can you get than where it was from the defendant? 
It was right next to him. He was driving the truck. Got his 
drugs hidden there in the compartment where nobody can see 
'em. He knows where it's at. $5,000. You know, he knew. He 
knew the drugs were there and he knew they were his and he 
knew what he was doing. 
We have had a little talk about fingerprints and why 
the law enforcement didn't get fingerprints. Well, maybe the 
perfect world, you know, all the evidence would be there 
and -- and they would be able to draw fingerprints off of 
every little -- little item. Unfortunately we don't live in 
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the world of — of the CSI television shows that you see. 
Commander Millett testified it!s oftentimes difficult to pull 
fingerprints. There's many cases that hefs worked where he 
hasnTt been able to get prints. And there!s more than a 
couple of cases, of the hundreds, where he had prints that — 
that actually solved the case. 
You know, itfs pretty strong evidence that — that 
it was his truck. The drugs were right next to him, right 
there in his truck. That's possession. To me that's 
possession. I don't -- I don't see how you can argue anything 
else. 
Ah, they were in his possession in his truck. It's 
a lot of money. He knew they were there. He was protecting 
them. He had them hidden away. 
You heard testimony from their witness that the 
truck was dirty -- very dirty inside. Yet this bag, which 
Officer Gower testified is in substantially the same condition 
it was in at the time it was taken from the truck. It looks 
pretty clean to me, as well as the scales and the baggies that 
are in there. 
Ah, it hadn't sat there. This -- this evidence 
hadn't sat in that truck, you know, for a long extended period 
of time. Ah, it was -- it was being taken in and out of the 
truck. I would say, based on the cleanness of the bag and the 
cleanness of the scales, you know, it just didn't sit there 
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for a long time. I mean it wasn't like somebody left these 
drugs in there and then forgot about it. Based on the 
evidence that I see, reasonable to infer that somebody was 
taking those drugs in and out of that compartment. And who 
was in a better position to do that than the owner of the 
vehicle? 
And so, you know, you'll get the chance to go back 
and sift through all this evidence and — and read your jury 
instructions and talk about it amongst yourselves, and, ah, 
find a way to reach a conclusion. 
I told you at the beginning of -- of the trial that 
I was gonna come back and ask you to convict the defendant, 
and I'm going to. I'm gonna ask you to convict him of 
unlawful — of Possession Of methamphetamine With Intent To 
Distribute, and Possession Of Drug Paraphernalia, because he 
did, in fact, possess — knowingly and intentionally possess 
methamphetamine, and a whole bunch of methamphetamine 
(Indicated) with the intent to distribute. And along with 
that methamphetamine, as there always is, ah, there's drug 
paraphernalia. And so we're gonna ask you to convict him of 
these two crimes. 
Now I'm gonna sit down. Mr. Slavens is gonna have a 
chance to get up and address you for a little bit. Of course, 
the burden, as I told you, is mine. And so what that means is 
after he's done, I'll have a chance to get up and talk a 
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little bit more. Maybe rebut anything that he may say or that 
he may bring up a point that I need to address in my closing. 
Ah, that's how the system works. The prosecution gets a 
chance to rebut what the defense says, because we have the 
burden of proof. And so I appreciate your time and, ah, Ifll 
say a little bit more when Mr. Slavens is done. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Garrett. 
Mr. Slavens. 
MR. SLAVENS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
DEFENSE CLOSING ARGUMENT 
BY MR. SLAVENS: This turns, doesnft it (Indicated)? 
THE COURT: Yeah. But it's nailed — it!s hooked to 
the floor cords, so you canft — 
MR. SLAVENS: Except — except for Ifve read it. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SLAVENS: All right. 
Ah, on -- on behalf of Bob, I!d like to, ah, thank 
you folks for taking the time out of your day today to come up 
and listen to the evidence that's been presented today. 
Ah, the Constitution Is a great thing that we have, 
and you've been a part of that process today, the 
constitution. And it promises each and every person that, 
ah — that when somebody is accused of a certain — of certain 
crimes and offenses, they have the right to confront their 
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witnesses and cross examine the witnesses the State presents. 
They have a right to call witnesses on their own behalf and 
have somebody from their peers come hear the evidence to see 
if they, ah, can reach a -- a verdict, ah, between them — 
amongst themselves as to whether or not the State has met its 
burden of proof proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and we 
appreciate you taking that time and doing that. 
I — I have noticed you. You've been very attentive 
ah, listeners to the evidence that's been presented. I think 
you will, ah, take this charge that you've, ah, entered into 
today seriously and — and review the evidence and see if the 
State's met its burden. 
As counsel's indicated to you, this is the only time 
I get to talk to you about the evidence and the application of 
the evidence to the law. He'll be able to get up and talk to 
you again. And then I won't be able to say, "Well, but wait," 
you know. "Do you remember this? Or do you remember that?" 
I won't be able to say that again. So I'm gonna ask you to do 
that on my behalf, if you would. Cause, ah, when — when, ah, 
counsel does, ah, dispute or challenge, ah, the positions that 
we're taking in this case, I ask you to say, "Well what would 
be the defense response to that and — and should we make that 
application, ah, on the rebuttal to what Mr. Garrett said?" 
Ah, because I won't have that opportunity to do that again. 
I think it's important, ah, to understand the law 
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and how to interpret the law in order to come to a fair 
verdict in this. And — and the very initial thing that the 
Judge told you about it!s important that you not be biased, 
ah, by the fact that, ah, Mr., ah -- or that Bob has been 
arrested or charged. There's absolutely no — no bias because 
of that fact. It -- it -- because of the presumption of 
innocence, because of the burden of proof, you can't — you 
can't use that against him or to use that as any weight on 
what the verdict should be is the fact that he's been arrested 
and charged. 
Ah, it's got to be completely based upon the 
evidence that's been, ah, presented today. It can't be based 
upon sentiment, guesswork, passion, prejudice, any of those 
things. It has — or, you know, some, ah, negative feelings 
you may have about drug use, in particular, or the fact that 
you think there was people that are getting away with it or 
anything. None of those things can play a factor on what, ah, 
verdict that you folks enter. It has to be based upon the 
evidence and based upon whether or not you feel the State has 
met its burden of proof. 
Each of you are individuals, and -- and we are 
entitled to that individual opinion. Now I think it's 
important. Like one of the instructions said that you don't 
get hooked on to an opinion so much that just by the fact that 
you're arguing makes you state it just because you're arguing 
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about that fact. But you are each individuals and you're each 
entitled to an opinion in this process of coming to a verdict. 
Jury, ah, Instruction No. 7 talks about the 
presumption of innocence and the presum- — ah — and I think 
it's important for you to keep that in — in mind. When we 
come here today, when we started this thing, when you start 
deliberating, he is innocent. And you have to re- — review 
the evidence and see if the State has taken, ah -- taken it 
out cf that — the posture of being presumed innocent and it 
was established that by, ah, beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Now, I think this is important to look at the, ah, 
jury -- the element offenses that are found in 10 and 11, and 
look at those closely. I'm only gonna go through, ah --
basically go through Instruction No. 10, because I think 
that's the more serious offense and I think it!s important to 
look at those things. 
Ah did the defendant act knowingly and 
intentionally? I think you need to look at that and see 
whether there!s any evidence to establish that beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Because like Mr. Garrett has indicated to 
you, each — each one of these elements -- every — every 
aspect of these elements have to be established beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Are you convinced, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the defendant acted knowingly and intentionally? 
The second element as to that said "Did the 
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defendant possess controlled substance meth?" Did he possess 
it? Is there any proof that establishes beyond a reasonable 
doubt that he knowingly and intentionally possessed meth? 
Ah, and did he do that possession with the intent to 
distribute? As — has the State presented any evidence that 
indicated that Mr. Sherry intended to distribute the drugs? 
And did the intent to possess and distribute occur 
on or about June 25 , 2004, and did it occur in Iron 
County? 
The same thing is true with, ah, the paraphernalia. 
Ah, was there paraphernalia there that meets the elements, ah, 
going through those elements as I have. Because if you 
remember, each of those elements have to be established beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Was there intent to distribute? Was 
there intent to possess? Was there intent to possess and 
distribute on June 25 in Iron County? You have to go 
through each one of those elements to come to a determination 
of whether or not the State has met its burden. 
Jury Instruction No. 13 talks about showing a 
connection. Itrs a constructive, ah, possession. Jury 
instruction shows that the State has the burden of 
establishing a connection between the drugs and the attempt to 
distribute and this defendant. I think it!s important that 
you keep that in mind when you are talking about this. 
I do want to talk a little bit about expert, because 
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there was some expert testimony that was presented. And, ah, 
I!m gonna get into a little bit about fingerprints. But it's 
my opinion that, ah, the expert opinion doesn't really add any 
significance to your deliberation, because if you recall, this 
expert -- the same person that's offering this expert opinion 
is also the one that said, "Well, he was guilty. We found — " 
— you know, "We found the drugs in his truck. He's guilty." 
And didn't do anything else to find anything. So I — I think 
the fact that he branded, ah, Mr. Sherry guilty, before doin1 
any sort of analysis, before doin' any sort of tests on the --
on the drugs, before -- without doing any fingerprint 
analysis, any of that type of stuff, he branded him guilty. 
And so I think any expert opinion, in regards to that is — 
and if you look at the instructions, I think those are the 
very factors that you need to weigh in determining whethe~r or 
not you give this expert any weight in — in the opinion. 
So I don't think the fact that he gave — any expert 
shouLd play any part in your deliberations, because he -- he 
found — he found him guilty when he found him in the truck 
with the drug -- or the drugs in the same truck that he was 
driving. And I don't think that was a fair assessment. 
Let's -- now keeping those facts in mind, let's go a 
little -- or keeping that law in mind, let's go over a little 
bit of the facts. I think the history of the vehicle -- of 
the vehicle is important in determining whether or not the 
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State's met its burden. If we remember, ah, there was — 
there was a time when, ah, Mr. Sherry purchased the vehicle. 
I don't think that's -- that's not disputed. It's never put 
in his name, obviously. But I don't think we're disputing or 
there's been any dispute to the fact that he owned the 
vehicle. 
However, it hadn't been licensed. It hadn't had any 
insurance since 1999. And you heard the testimony that was 
presented by, ah, Scott. It hadn't ran. It hadn't ran for 
years. It was a — basically, ah, a vacated vehicle that 
wasn't running. And it only ran for a — a few hours before 
the stop was made. It sat, ah, somewhere for a period — for 
a long period of time. It hadn't been functioning since 1999. 
I think that's a fair assumption to make. And for at least a 
period of time, it was in the parking lot, ah, in — 
Agrinautics parking lot. 
There was no door key to it. There was no way to 
lock the vehicle up. Ah, all — all that they had was an 
ignition key. This was a 1980 something. I don't know what 
the testimony was of the vehicle. A Chevy pickup. So it — 
it was an older pickup. Ah, needed a lot of work. And I 
think around town we've seen these vehicles parked all over 
the place. And you know — I think in your own mind you have 
a — a -- a memory of that type of vehicle and the type of 
situation. 
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As we get closer to the time period of when this 
happened, ah, they worked on it for a period of time. 
Changed -- took the engine out over in the parking lot. And 
that took about a two-week process. And then just the night 
before, they brought it over, put the new engine in. The next 
morning they had to make some more repairs to it. Fine tune 
the carburetor. Get the breaks workin'. And then he drove 
it. And within a very short period of time, ah, he was picked 
up. So we went from a vehicle that was not running, it was 
not functioning, to, ah -- to the stop. So there's not a lot 
of period of time that was in Mr., ah, Sherry's control. And 
I don't think you can come to the conclusion it was ever in 
his exclusive control. 
And I think that's where Jury Instruction No. 9 
comes in play. And I want to spend a little bit more time 
with Instruction No. 9. In fact, I'm gonna read verbatim 
first paragraph of that: "If the evidence in this case is 
susceptible of two constructions or interpretations, each of 
which appears to you to be reasonable and one of which points 
to the guilt of the defendant while the other points to his 
innocence, it is your duty under the law to adopt that 
interpretation which will admit to the defendant's innocence 
and reject that which points to his guilt." 
And that's part of the reasonable doubt Jury 
Instruction. Is there a reasonable doubt? If there's another 
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reasonable explanation of the facts, you have to expect — 
accept that reasonable explanation and find the — find that 
the State has not met its burden of proof. 
Now, maybe you!d point well, we think it probably 
happened this way, but we could see how it may happened this 
other way. To me that's reasonable doubt. So it!s not a 
balancing thing. Okay, we're gonna — this one weighs more 
this more, so we're gonna go with this one (Indicated). It's 
not that. It's the question is is there reasonable doubt? 
Now there's only — I guess it can boil down to 
two -- two interpretations. One, he knew about it, or he 
didn't know about it. I mean that's — that's the two 
choices. There's no other options. He either knew about it 
being there or he didn't know about it. 
And the question — I think the question or way to 
analyze that is is there any evidence that establishes that he 
knew about that in there? And perhaps maybe — maybe a way to 
look at it would be, ah, cause it's only very difficult to 
prove the negative. I mean, for example, if, ah -- if we went 
out into, ah, the parking lot or you just went and bought a 
brand new car and somebody looked inside this — this 
compartment that's behind the door panel and found some drugs, 
how would you be able to prove that you didn't put it there? 
You just barely picked up the car. You — you maybe bought it 
last week, but it's been having some repair, and you — and 
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you just go and pick it up. How do you prove that you didn't 
put those drugs there? 
Well, I think the very first thing a person would 
say is, "Check it for fingerprints. You're gonna find out my 
fingerprints aren't on there." And that's a normal reaction. 
That would sew it up. If you checked that the — and the 
testimony was the — the surfaces, you could find 
fingerprints. 
The scales. That was a surface that is susceptible 
to fingerprints. The baggies, those are surfaces that are 
susceptible to fingerprints. So all they would have had to 
have done to eliminate the possibility that Bob didn't know 
about it is just see if his fingerprints are on it, because 
how could he say, "I didn't know about it?" How could any 
person, when something is discovered in there, ah, dispute the 
fact that there's fingerprints on there? So that would have 
been an easy way to completely get rid of that reasonable 
interpretation of the facts. 
Another would - - way would be to show that that's — 
that person had exclusive control of that area. If — if it 
was established that Bob was the only person that had access 
to that cubbyhole, ah, where the drugs were found, then --
then — then they would be reasonable to say he didn't know 
about it. But there hasn't been any proof that he had 
exclusive control of it. 
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It was in the parking lot forever. It wouldn't 
lock. It was in this shop being repaired forever with workers 
comin' and going. So Mr. Sherry has not had exclusive control 
of that area. There's lots of people who had control of that 
area. 
And when we talked about the value of this — these 
drugs, ah, I mean why would a person, ah — I mean that goes 
both ways. Why would a person carry that much drugs around or 
that much money around and not be able to lock it up? It's 
not in distribution form. I mean it's not already in the 
little bags. There's no indication that it was being put into 
little bags or that he was going to distribute. So why would 
you carry it in a vehicle that you can't even lock up? That 
doesn't make sense either. Or at least it raises to the level 
of reasonable doubt. 
So the value of the drugs, it doesn't prove one way 
or another, or it doesn't conclusively show either way as to 
whether or not he had knowledge of it being in there. 
Ah, where it was located doesn't tell us whether he 
knew. It was back behind there. Ah, the officer, ah, 
testified that there's no way you could have seen — just by 
looking at that hole in the panel, would you have seen the 
bag? You had to reach in before you — you could find it. 
Well, who's gonna reach inside a cubbyhole? How many times 
have you got in a car that didn't did have a speaker thing and 
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you reached in there to see if there was anything back there? 
Nobody does that. It could be — it could have been there for 
a long period of time before somebody had reached back there. 
Maybe until somebody got arrested and the -- and the vehicle 
was searched. 
It might have been the only time that somebody would 
have reached in there. Or a time to change the speakers or 
put speakers in there. 
Ah, and the fingerprints, to me, is a big issue. 
That's -- thatTs the thing that could have shown guilt or 
innocence. It could go both ways. It could have shown Bob's 
fingerprints on it. Then it would be very difficult, if not 
impossible, to then say, "Well, I didnft — I don't know how 
my fingerprints got there. But they're there and I — I had 
no knowledge of it." 
It may have been able to establish that maybe 
somebody else that had access to the vehicle's fingerprints on 
it and then, ah — and then that — that we could have pursued 
that angle to see if that person had control or could exercise 
control over the vehicle. But when you have a situation like 
we have here when Bob is not the only one that — that the 
State has not established in any manner exclusive control in 
Bob's — in Bob's favor against Bob, and the fact that we 
don't have any fingerprints to prove or establish that he 
touched this or ever had control of it, I don't think the 
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State has met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
that he's guilty of what theyfve charged him with. 
So for this reason, I think as you go through each 
of the elements that we went through before, you're gonna find 
that the State has not met its burden, that there are 
questions in your mind about whether or not, ah, Bob had 
exclusive control of it, and that he possessed it with the 
intent to distribute it in Iron County on that date. 
I also -- and I remind you again that, ah, Mr. 
Garrett's gonna be able to counter some of the things. I 
invite you to please say, "What would — what would Mr. 
Slavens1 response be to that counterpoint?" And then come to 
your conclusion as you go and deliberate. 
Again, I appreciate your time and your efforts in 
this matter. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Slavens. Mr. Garrett, 
you're final remarks. 
MR. GARRETT: Thank you. 
PLAINTIFF'S FINAL CLOSING ARGUMENT 
BY MR. GARRETT: One of the jury instructions, ah, 
directs you to not consider the possible penalty. Mr. Slavens 
indicated that Instruction 10 has a more severe penalty than 
Instruction 11. In other words, the Unlawful Possession Of 
Meth With Intent To Distribute is more severe penalty than 
would be Possession Of Drug Paraphernalia. It's your job and 
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instruction is you're not to consider the possible penalty. 
You're to apply the facts to the law and — 
MR, SLAVENS: Your Honor, Ifm gonna have to take 
exception to that, cause I think what I said was it was a more 
serious charge. I didn't say anything about penalties. 
THE COURT: Sustained. But that is what you said. 
But I don't know that that changes the argument. 
MR. GARRETT: Yes. A more serious charge. 
THE COURT: Correct. 
MR. GARRETT: Ah, but you're not to consider it. 
If — if you find that the State has met its elements as 
outlined in Instruction 10, then, ah, you're to convict, 
regardless of the penalty. Okay? 
Ah, constructive possession. There's a — there's a 
difference between constructive possession and actual 
possession. Let me give you an example. If two people are — 
are Ln a vehicle and they're driving down the road and they're 
stopped, the car is stopped, ah, and there's drugs in the 
vehicle, okay? Ah, it may be that they -- they belong to the 
driver. Okay? 
The question is did the passenger also 
constructively possess? They may not be his drugs. But 
they'd be possessed them. Did he have -- did he have the 
intent to, ah, to possess them? The ability to possess them? 
Were they within reach? Did he have the intent to exercise 
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control or dominion over the drugs? 
Ah, i think itfs a case of actual possession. Not 
constructive possession. I think he possessed them. They're 
his. They're nobody else's. 
We are not saying that they belong to somebody else, 
but he may have had the intent to exercise control or dominion 
over them. We're saying that -- that they're his drugs and 
that he posted them -- he actually posted them. Not 
constructively. 
Ah, Mr. Slavens talked about, ah, Commander 
Millett's testimony as an expert and how you should disregard 
that because he had him pegged guilty from the start. Well, 
I'd remind you that this actually is Agent Gower's case. He's 
the one take arrested the defendant. Captain Millett came in 
after and looked at the evidence and made some conclusions, 
based upon his training and experience. But he didn't — he 
didn't actually make the arrest. And this wasn't his — his 
investigative case. 
He reviewed the evidence and made some conclusions 
in expert today, which I think were very helpful. One thing 
that he talked about was the evidence, ah, being fresh. And 
you've heard more testimony from Agent Gower about how there 
wasn't any dust on the evidence -- on the bag. He talked 
about that, suggesting that it had been taken in and out. 
MR. SLAVENS: Your Honor, this is — I object to 
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this as not being rebuttal, and I think it's also saying 
testimony that's not in evidence. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
MR. GARRETT: So, you know, if — if the defense is 
that the drugs were there when he bought the vehicle, I think 
that that's not reasonable, given the condition of the bag, 
the fact that there wasn't any dust, rust, or other dirt or 
items on the bag. I think it — it had been placed there 
recently and had been used and taken in and out. 
Ah, there was some testimony about there not being 
a — a key to open the truck. You may or may not find that 
testimony to be credible. But even — let's assume that it is 
credible and there wasn't a key. I think that's the reason 
why the drugs are hidden in the secret compartment, you know, 
so they're not out open to the public view. So if somebody 
walks by, they don't see the $5,000 or equivalent of $5,000 
sitting on the — in the cab of the vehicle. Nice little 
place to hide the drugs right there (Indicated). 
And Instruction No. 9 talks about — he read this to 
you. It talks about if there's two reasonable constructions, 
then you're to adopt the one that allows his innocence and 
reject the other. Well, I don't think there's two reasonable 
constructions here. I've only heard one. Like I told you, I 
don't give you evidence. Mr. Slavens doesn't give you 
evidence. The evidence comes from the witnesses. The 
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evidence was that we found drugs in the defendant's vehicle 
and that it was his vehicle. 
What evidence did you get, other than that, to 
suggest that the drugs weren't his? 
Ah, there was no — no evidence put before you. 
The witness that testified for the defense, he 
didn't — did he give you anything? 
MR. SLAVENS: Your Honor, I'm gonna object to this 
because it's attempting to shift the burden, and the burden 
never shifts to the defendant to produce any evidence. 
THE COURT: I disagree with that comment and I will 
overrule the objection. However, I will instruct the jury 
that the burden always remains with the State to prove the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Before any 
conviction occurs, the defendant never has the responsibility 
to prove his innocence. 
Go ahead with your argument. 
MR. GARRETT: Thank you. 
Well the argument was is I don't see two stories 
before you. I think if there had been some evidence presented 
that — that somebody else had left the drugs in the vehicle, 
then you might have another — you might have a defense. You 
might have another story to consider. But the evidence that 
you have before you is the drugs were found in his vehicle. 
He was driving the vehicle. That's it. There was nothing 
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else for you to consider. And so I don't think there is two 
reasonable constructions. I think there's one. 
Fingerprints. I just want to touch on that again 
briefly. Do you think we wouldn't be here? Let's assume, for 
argument's sake, that they had found some fingerprints on this 
evidence. Do you think we wouldn't be here today? Or might 
we be here and might the defense be yeah, "Well, yeah, his 
fingerprints on there. Ah, but those -- those weren't his. 
They were his buddies, you know." Or "Yeah, he -- he may have 
had this in his house and touched this scale. But he — he 
didn't have it together with the drugs, and the drugs weren't 
his." Would that be where we're at? 
I submit that we'd till be here today. Even if we 
had a fingerprint, the arguments of the defense might be 
"These were changed." It might be a little different. But I 
think we'd still be here. 
Ah, he made a statement that nobody reaches into a 
cubbyhole. Ah, again, it's a great place to hide the drugs, 
if you want to keep it out of sight. Especially if you're — 
you know, if you're gonna get pulled over by a police officer. 
Ah, you know, you hope that he comes up next to the window to 
talk to you and he's not gonna see it from that vantage point 
(Indicated). 
Sometimes juries get — they get caught up in, ah, 
suppression issues and things like that when they get back to 
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deliberate. I just want to tell you that — that those 
issues, ah, have already been resolved in this case. In other 
words, --
MR. SLAVENS: Now this is — thatTs inappropriate. 
THE COURT: Sustained. That is inappropriate. 
There!s no evidence in the record regarding that the jury can 
consider. 
MR. GARRETT: Okay. My point is that when you get 
back to deliberate, ah, you're not to consider search and 
seizure issues or whether or not the search was lawful that 
was performed by Detective Gower. That your law, as itrs 
contained in those instructions, 1 through 24, that's where 
you're to find your law and your instructions. And anything 
outside of that, ah, is not to be considered by — by the 
jury, together in your deliberations. That is where your law 
is contained. 
And so if you have questions about anything, you 
know, regarding this case, as far as the law goes, you'll 
refer to your jury instruction and there you'll find the 
answers. 
Ah, I appreciate your — your attendance, ah, here 
today, the way that you listened to the facts. Ah, I -- I 
hope that, ah, you'll go back and then you'll take the time to 
read through the Instructions, ah, apply the law to the facts 
as you've heard 'em, consider the evidence. And when you're 
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done, I hope you return a — or your -- excuse me -- a verdict 
of guilty, because he did possess methamphetamine. The 
defendant possessed Methamphetamine with the intent to 
distribute the same (Indicated). And he also possessed drug 
paraphernalia in the form of the scales and the baggies 
(Indicated). 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Garrett. 
I!ll ask the Bailiff to take the oath to take charge 
of the jury. 
CLERK: Do you solemnly swear that you will take 
charge of this jury and keep them together in the Jury Room, 
that you will not allow any person to communicate with them 
during the course of their deliberations nor communicate with 
them yourself, except to inquire as to whether they've agreed 
upon a verdict, that you will not communicate to any person 
the state of their deliberations nor the verdict agreed upon, 
and that you will return them to the courtroom when directed 
by the Court, so help you God. 
BAILIFF: Yes, mam. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Ladies and gentlemen, the time has come for you to 
begin your deliberations. That means you're now free to 
discuss the case among yourselves. 
You'll take with you, into the Jury Room, the Jury 
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It is my duty now to begin instructing you concerning the law applicable in this case, 
and it is your duty as jurors to apply the law as I shall state it to you. 
The function of the jury is to try the issues of fact that are raised by the charges in the 
Information filed by the State of Utah and the defendant's plea of "Not Guilty" to those 
charges. You should perform that duty uninfluenced by pity for the defendant or by passion 
or prejudice against him. You must not suffer yourselves to be biased against the defendant 
because of the fact that he has been arrested or because an Information has been filed against 
him or because he has been brought before the Court to stand trial. None of these facts is 
evidence of his guilt, and you are not permitted to infer or to speculate from any or all of 
them that he is more likely to be guilty than innocent. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 
You are to be governed in this case by the evidence presented to you and the law as I 
state it to you. You may not consider mere sentiment, guesswork, sympathy, passion, 
prejudice, public opinion or public feeling in deciding the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant. Both the State of Utah and the defendant have a right to expect that you, and 
each of you, will conscientiously, seriously and impartially consider and weigh the evidence 
and properly apply the law to reach a just verdict, regardless of what the consequences of 
that verdict maybe. 
The verdict must express the individual opinion of each juror. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
You are the exclusive judges of the facts, and the effect, value and weight of the 
evidence produced in this case. You may consider any evidence which is admitted by me. 
You may not consider evidence which is excluded or which is admitted and later ordered by 
me to be stricken. Likewise, you may not consider as evidence statements of the attorneys, 
or any hint or intimation of the truth or falsity of any fact or evidence made by the attorneys. 
Statements, arguments and remarks of the attorneys are intended to help you 
understand the evidence and apply the law, but such statements are not evidence. You 
should disregard any statement of an attorney which has no basis in the evidence coming 
from witnesses, documents or stipulations received in evidence in this case. 
Of course, if the attorneys stipulate to any fact or facts and that stipulation is accepted 
by me, you may regard the stipulated fact or facts as conclusively proven and shown without 
additional evidence. 
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Instructions, and you may each take your copy, ah, as well as 
the evidence that's been received as exhibits here and the 
verdict form. Would you follow the Bailiff into the jury 
room. 
(Jury left courtroom.) 
PROCEEDINGS CONTINUED OUTSIDE PRESENCE OF JURY 
THE COURT: The jury has now left the room. The 
door is closed. We111 be in recess until — 
DEFENSE MOTION FOR MISTRIAL 
BY MR. SLAVENS: Your Honor, I!d like to make a 
motion. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. SLAVENS: You know, I know Mr. Garrett very 
well. I think he's — he's a good man, an honorable man. But 
I am just shocked that he would tell the jury that the 
discretion areas -- issues have already been taken — taken 
care of. I have no idea why he would say something like that 
to a jury. I think that's prosecutorial misconduct to say 
that. I don't think there's any legitimate reason to say 
that. It has nothing to do with any defense that we presented 
and does nothing more than try and tell the jury that there's 
evidence out there that he wasn't able to present. 
THE COURT: And so what's your motion? 
MR. SLAVENS: Well, I think the charges should be 
dismissed because of it, and at the very least, a mistrial. 



























THE COURT: You're moving for a mistrial. 
MR. SLAVENS: Well, yes. 
THE COURT: On the basis of prosecutorial 
MR. SLAVENS: Yes. I think -- I don't know what the 
law is, as far as, ah, what happens after the jury has been 
impaneled and read the Jury Instructions, whether or not 
double jeopardy forbids further — 
THE COURT: Well jeopardy attaches when they were 
sworn this morning at the beginning of the proceedings. 
MR. SLAVENS: Yes. So I don't know whether what I'm 
asking for is a mistrial or that it can't be further 
prosecuted because of double jeopardy. But I — I think 
that's a way. And I — I need further research to come to 
that determination. But I think that this jury has been 
tainted because of that statement. 
THE COURT: Now tell me what the prejudice is to 
your client. 
MR. SLAVENS: Well, he -- he said to — he said to 
the jury that, ah, the suppression issues have already been 
taken care of. 
THE COURT: Which is true. 
MR. SLAVENS: Well, the fact there was nothing 
suppressed in this case. 
THE COURT: Oh, yes there was. 
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1 other case, we can't go into inquire as to what they1re 
2 deliberating. 
3 THE COURT: Um-hm. 
4 MR. SLAVENS: Now they start deliberating, we can 
5 never use any deliberation in there. And so we have this 
6 statement out there that the discretion issues have already 
7 been taken up. They don't know that there was no evidence 
8 suppressed. So if they — so they — they -- there's a 
9 possibility that they're in there saying, "Well dang. We 
10 don't -- we didn't even get all the evidence." 
11 THE COURT: Okay. Do you have any authority that 
12 supports the position that mentioning the fact that there was 
13 a suppression issue that — 
14 MR. GARRETT: Judge — Judge, I didn't mention there 
15 was a suppression hearing. I said sometimes juries get back 
16 and they worry about searches, referring to the search of the 
17 vehicle. I said that --
18 THE COURT: You did make the statement that the 
19 suppression issues had been taken care of already. 
20 MR. GARRETT: Any suppression issues would have been 
21 taken care of at this point — 
22 THE COURT: Yeah. 
23 MR. GARRETT: — and that you're not to consider — 
24 what I didn't want them to do, goin' back there and saying, 
25 Hey, he searched the vehicle," you know, "why did he search 
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it?" That's the purpose of — of me saying what I said. 
THE COURT: Do you realize that you were presenting 
evidence to the jury that hasn't been presented? 
MR. GARRETT: Well, he presented evidence to the 
jury that hadn't been presented. 
THE COURT: Which was? Are you making a motion. 
MR. GARRETT: No. I'm not making a motion. 
THE COURT: Ha-ha ha. Okay. All right. 
MR. GARRETT: I'm not just saying that. I just 
didn't want them to get back in there and say that Tony 
Gower's search was illegal and therefore — you know, those 
things — 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. GARRETT: They've been instructed on the law. 
THE COURT: They have. 
MR. SLAVENS: And I think that would — 
THE COURT: But right now back to my question. Do 
you have any legal authority to support your motion for a 
mistrial? 
MR. SLAVENS: Well, other than I — I don't think 
there's any dispute that it's improper to tell, ah, the jury 
about any suppression hearing, about exercising the right to 
remain silent or any of those things — anything — 
THE COURT: Well, but you — let's talk about just 
the issue here. Where is there any case law that says that 
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1 celling them that there!s been a suppression issue dealt with 
2 is prosecutorial misconduct rising to the level that requires 
3 a mistrial? Have you got any authority to that effect? 
4 MR. SLAVENS: I — I haven't researched it, 
5 THE COURT: I know there's authority on the question 
6 of whether you comment on the defendant's right to remain 
7 silent. That clearly constitutes prosecutorial misconduct. 
8 MR. SLAVENS: Well, I think that's — yean. And 
9 that's the only — that's the only case law I know of. And I 
10 think by, you know, analyzing it, I think is the same thing. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. 
12 Now, Mr. Garrett, do you want to respond on the 
13 subject of any legal authority? 
14 MR. GARRETT: Well, I'm not aware of any legal 
15 authority, Your Honor. A, like I said, I've seen it before 
16 where juries go back there and then they want to — they want 
17 to talk about search and seizure. I'm merely stating that 
18 that's not — that's inappropriate at this point. Your law is 
19 in the Jury Instructions. Any issues regarding that would 
20 have been resolved at this point. And that -- that was my 
21 intent and my purpose of making that statement. 
22 THE COURT: All right. 
23 Do you have any final remarks on the subject? 
24 MR. SLAVENS: Well, yeah. I — I question that 
25 because there wasn't any evidence or argument or anything 
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questioning the search to the jury. And I — I've done a lot 
of jury trials and Ifve never seen a jury go back there and 
try and deliberate -- you know, deliberate whether or not the 
search was legal or not. I mean that — that just — Ifm just 
completely confounded why, ah, the prosecutor would say that. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SLAVENS: I think the only — the only — the 
only reason I could see is to get them to thinking that there 
might have been some evidence that they weren't able to hear. 
THE COURT: Well, all right. 
I didn't hear anything in the comment that would 
have inferred to the jury that there was other evidence that 
they weren't told about. Ah, so I don't view that as the 
purpose of the statement. On the other hand. I don't think 
that's appropriate for the prosecutor for tell the jury about 
prior proceedings that aren't in the — aren't in the 
evidence. Ah, so I find that I think that it was 
inappropriate to make that comment that those issues had 
already been dealt with. On the other hand, I don't think it 
rises to the level that requires a mistrial, so I'm gonna deny 
the motion for a mistrial. 
Anything else we need to deal with at that point? 
MR. GARRETT: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: We'll be in recess until the jury has 
reached a verdict or until further order of the Court. 
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